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“An enormous influence on the fate of nations emanates from the economic
bleeding which the needs of the state necessitates, and from the use to which
the results are put.”
Schumpeter et al. (1918)
1. Introduction
Why does newly installed infrastructure in developing countries often wither away over
time? Why have empirical studies never been able to find a strong impact of foreign aid
on long-term economic growth or per-capita income? What kind of reforms will turn a
low-income country into a middle-income country? These are the stark questions that still
confound policymakers and academics.
The Solow-Swan growth framework1 remains the most tractable model for understanding
economic growth in countries where the evolution of technology is not an endogenously
determined process. Its intellectual influence is hard to overstate given its pedagogical value,
its relevance in contemporary policy-making and its use in a range of disciplines beyond
economics. Yet, the Solow-Swan framework is unable to shed any light on the questions
posed above. The objective of the paper is to augment the Solow-Swan growth framework
to answer these questions. At the heart of the Solow-Swan growth framework lies the notion
that output that is not consumed can be costlessly transformed into new capital that can then
be used to produce output in the next period. Exactly what Solow-Swan framework means
by its physics-defying notion of capital is important to understand if it is to be augmented
to answer the questions we pose.
This paper contends that the received wisdom on Solow-Swan growth framework2 over the
years has stuck too closely to the original formulation. The rather broad category of privately
owned capital is unable to satisfactorily accommodate tax-funded publicly owned capital and
1The Solow-Swan model of economic growth was developed independently by Robert Solow and Trevor Swan
and published simultaneously in Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).
2This paper uses the word framework to refer to the way the have been received, which maybe distinct from
the ideas in the orignal papers. There is some evidence in Solow (2007) and La Grandville and Solow (2009)
that this is an important distinction.
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its impact on the economy. The paper uses first principles to argue that it is necessary to
augment the Solow-Swan framework by adding the fiscal channel that funds public capital
— an addition that changes the nature of the model quite dramatically. In doing so, we
formulate an approach that incorporates the institutional features associated with the fiscal
capacity of a country into the model and show how the convergence properties of the model
are contingent on the fiscal capacity. The paper further demonstrates how aspects of fiscal
capacity interact with the conventional saving channel in determining the steady state per-
capita income level. Consequently, any capital markets reform or foreign aid will have a
negligible effect on per-capita income unless it is accompanied by concomitant fiscal reform.
At the heart of Solow-Swan framework is the saving channel through which capital accu-
mulation channel takes place and results in the growth of per-capita income. This channel
costlessly transforms output that is not consumed into new capital stock. The new capital
stock can then either augment capital stock of the economy or compensate for the deprecia-
tion of the pre-existing capital stock. Capital stock accumulates or de-accumulates until the
economy reaches a steady-state where the output that is saved and transformed into capital
just about meets the depreciation needs of the pre-existing capital stock and the capital
accumulation process comes to a standstill. There are of course specific conditions under
which one or more steady states exist and the economy converges or diverges from these
steady states.
The Solow-Swan framework was able to show that the economy converges to a unique
steady state if the production function of the economy exhibits constant returns to scale and
diminishing returns to capital. These properties of the production function and competitive
markets for factor inputs create the tendency of convergence and homogenisation within
the functional sub-units of the modern economy. Given this tendency to homogenise, the
distinction between production process at the aggregate level and within its functional sub-
unit is inconsequential. Herein lies at least one justification for categorising all variety of
capital under the rubric of just one homogenous type of capital.
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The received wisdom on Solow-Swam framework suggests that output and capital variables
do not represent their actual physicality but an abstract notion of resources. These resources
are then represented by nominal assets that can be traded in the capital markets. The
homogenisation tendency in the modern economy helps in unifying the myriad physicality of
capital and output into one single asset class.3 Hence, the critical role played by the saving
channel in the Solow-Swan framework. There maybe numerous types of capital, but if a
single asset class can represent them, then for all practical purposes, they can be represented
by a single type of capital. The fact that the abstract notion of capital in economic growth
models is inextricably tied with the channel that facilitates its creation is rarely appreciated
and requires to be stressed at the risk of inducing ennui in order to create the context for the
results of the paper. The fiscal and saving channels capture the dichotomy of the modern
economy in terms of the way in which the economic activity can be organised.
1.1. Public Goods. Following Samuelson (1954), public goods are evaluated along the
dimensions of excludability and rivalry. Yet, the calculus of public finances is the third
dimension that is often completely disregarded. Conceptually, all services are excludable at
a cost. For instance, a local public road can be made excludable, at a cost that may be
considered excessive for the benefits it provides. Rivalry captures the way in which benefits
derived from a service varies with the number of people using the service. Public goods are
subject to congestion if they provide services that are rivalrous — a category of public good
that is associated with what William Forster Lloyd called “the tragedy of the commons” in
a pamphlet published in 1833.4 Hardin (1968) calls this a “rebuttal to the invisible hand” or
“tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions
for an entire society”.5 Herein lies the sharp distinction between congestible public goods
provided by the state and private capital intermediated by decentralised capital markets.
3Since there is no uncertainty in the framework, its does not matter if the asset is debt or equity.
4Hardin (1968) quoting Lloyd (1833)
5Hardin (1968) summarising the Adam Smith’s influence on contemporary thinking.
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Edwards (1990) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992) conceptualises public goods congestion
as the decline in an individual’s ability to use their capital stock to derive benefits from the
public good. This definition applies to industrialised countries where capital is abundant
and production is capital intensive. In developing countries, capital is scarce and individuals
own scant amount of capital. A more appropriate definition of congestion of public goods in
developing countries is the decline in individual’s ability to directly derive benefits from the
public good for some productive use.
In the context of commuting to work, an example of congestion in a high-income country
would an individual’s declining ability to derive benefits from her car while using a public
road due to congestion. An example of congestion in low-income country would be declining
benefit from using a publicly owned bus to commute to work. Kremer et al. (2005) find
that teachers are less likely to be absent in rural schools in India that are closer to a paved
road. Banerjee and Duflo (2006) has similar examples in health care delivery. Consequently,
for a low-income country, congestion of public goods like roads, schools, hospital and courts
are due to low-stock of public goods. Reasons for which are ultimately due to the low level
of economic activity that can be taxed and ploughed back into accumulating public goods.
Thompson (1974) argues that even national defense is subject to congestion. Congestion is
thus far more widespread that is often considered in economic growth literature and may
even apply beyond the context of developing countries.
Samuelson (1954) presented the criteria of excludability and rivalry are discrete innate
characteristics of a good, evident at the micro-level. Yet, cost of exclusion and rivalry are a
continuum and best understood from a macro general-equilibrium perspective. The cost of
exclusion often depends on the set of public goods and institutions available in the society and
pattern of rivalry varies over geography and social networks. Whether excluding individuals
from a service requires a simple sign or a private militia depends on the legal framework and
enforcement capacity of the state and other institutions.
The government’s budget constraint determines which public goods are provided. The
budget constraint is influenced by the tax revenues derived from economic activity in the
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economy. Providing public goods that have a propensity to generate tax revenues and loosen
its budget constraints will allow it to expand its range of public goods and transition to the
optimal mix of public and private capital. The model in this paper is trying to capture the
critical role the fiscal and savings channels play in this transition.6
1.2. Economic Growth Literature. The argument in growth has been about whether
the returns to capital are diminishing or not. If they diminish, then growth slows down at
the economy approaches steady state. Conversely, if they are not diminishing for instance
in an AK types endogenous growth model, then a country can potentially have a perpetual
growth. Solow-Swan growth framework had assumed diminishing returns to capital.
Lucas (1988) assumed individuals acquire human capital by spending time in education
institutions accumulating skills and Mankiw et al. (1992) assume that people acquire hu-
man capital simply by foregoing consumption. In both papers, human capital enters the
production function just like the labour-augmenting technological change in the Solow-Swan
framework and can provide perpetual growth as human capital of workers keeps increasing.
Romer(1986, 1990) modelled knowledge as a non-rivalrous factor input, which was accumu-
lated as a spillover effect of capital investment. Romer’s insight was that even though private
returns from private capital investment maybe diminishing, if the investment has a spillover
effect, then the social returns to capital may be higher and possible non-diminishing.
This led to Rebelo’s notion of “broad capital” (Rebelo, 1991). Broad capital is a compos-
ite variable that includes human capital, ideas, knowledge and organisation capital. Each
individual factor input may exhibit diminishing returns but taken together they exhibit non-
diminishing returns to scale. The key is the accumulation of all inputs take places through a
decentralised market mechanism, i.e., a channel that looks very similar to the saving channel.
Thus, their dynamic paths look very similar. Barro (1990) analyses public goods by putting
6In analysing public private partnerships, Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that if contracts it is not possible
to write complete contracts then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the
benefits generated by it relatively more.
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it under the hood of broad capital into an endogenous growth model and finds no significant
role for fiscal policy.
The range of factor inputs in the production function can be divided into three broad
categories — animate, inanimate and abstract. Animate factor inputs are inputs that are
inalienable to the humans. In the growth literature, this has been labelled human capital.
Inanimate factor inputs are the physical stock of public goods and private capital. The
abstract covers ideas, knowledge and beliefs. The economic growth literature has examined
capital, human capital and institutions as factors whose accumulation leads to sustained
prosperity.
Yet, as we argue below, the important classification is whether it is cost-effective to let
the factor accumulation occur through a decentralised market process where the individuals
are driven by their personal interest or whether it is more cost-effective to accumulate that
factor through collective coordination under the guise of a government, taking into account
the inefficiencies associated with any process that involves government. Besley and Ghatak
(2005) suggest that given that inherently motivated agents are less incentivised, it is possible
to create mission-oriented public bureaucracies, nonprofits and education providers if mission
orientation of the organisation is matched with innate mission p preference of the agent.
Given the multitude of pathways, it is difficult to establish the empirical link between the
role of government plays in providing public goods and how it affects factor accumulation
process. In the next section, we present some empirical evidence that looks at this links.
1.3. Results. The model sets out the system of autonomous non-linear difference equation
system that describe the evolution of the economy. The system has two endogenous variables,
the stock of public goods and private capital and it captures the fiscal and saving channel.
The main result of the paper is that for an economy with a general production function that
exhibits constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to both the stock of congestible
public goods and private capital, a unique steady state exists and the economy converges to
it. It further shows that both channels are complementary and lethargy in either channel
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leads results in low per-capita income. This requires concomitantly enhancing the efficacy
of the saving and fiscal channel. Needless to say, a country cannot achieve prosperity unless
and until is able to manage the “fortunes of the commons”.
2. Empirical Evidence
2.1. Fiscal channel. Developing fiscal capacity has historically been extremely important
for countries that have developed (Besley et al., 2013, Aidt and Jensen, 2009). Besley et al.
(2013) show that potentially three types of types of states can emerge in the long run:
a common-interest state which spends tax revenues on public goods, a redistributive-state
which spends tax-revenues on transfers, and a weak-state with no transfers and a low stock
of public goods. Our fiscal channel has two components, the tax rate and the proportion of
taxes spent on public goods. It follows from Besley et al. (2013) that developing a “common-
interest state” is a pre-requisite for prosperity and a prosperous state can also transition back
to a redistributive state. We show in our model that the optimal golden rule tax rate is a
function of the proportion of taxes spent on public goods, which in turn depends on the kind
of aforementioned state the country has developed.
Fiscal capacity evolves slowly and there are instances where it is effective in spite of its
leakages and could potentially transition a weak-state to common-interest state. Engerman
and Sokoloff (2007) examine the building of the Erie Canals and other canals by the New
York State during the antebellum period considers it a success in spite of the corruption,
fraud and mismanagement. The paper suggests that New York state took up the role of
constructing the canal largely because the scope of investment was beyond what private firms
could manage on their own. The Ghani et al. (2016) find that output levels in the districts
in the 0-10 kilometre output levels grew by 49% over the decade after the construction
began. Since 0-10 km range contains a third of India’s manufacturing base, this represents a
substantial boost in India’s economic activity. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) has found that there
are substantial gaps in marginal products of labour and capital across plants within narrowly
defined industries in China and India compared with the United States and attributes this
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to misallocation of capital. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) are silent on how this marginal product
varies is local public goods stock. The pertinent question is whether there exists a larger
misallocation of capital between the public goods and private capital.
2.2. Savings channel. Besley (1995) present the confounding evidence about the way the
poor saving. The savings of the poor are driven by a number of institutional, social and
environmental factors. Saving plays numerous roles including the of role of self-insurance in
absence of easy access to credit. Consequently, there are susu men in Africa who charge a
deposit rate, in effect a negative rate for keeping the saving safe. The empirical evidence
on poor’s saving rate does not chime with the consumption smoothing results derived from
either Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans7 or Diamond (1965) model. Solow-Swan framework with an
exogenously given saving rate is thus the appropriate model for our purposes. Dercon (2005)
presents evidence from African rural communities that prevalence of covariate risk within
the community reduces the lucrative opportunities for saving. During a negative covariate
shock like famine or flood, when a lender needs their savings back, the borrower is incapable
of paying. Papers like Sapienza (2004) and La Porta et al. (2002) have argued that state
control of the banking sector makes it susceptible to elite capture. Conversely, show how
the Indian government used nationalisation of the banks Burgess and Pande (2005) to force
the nationalised banks to open bank branches in previously unbanked areas. This led to
a significant increase in saving rate where new local branches were established and had an
overall impact on saving rate in India. Access to formal banking allowed them to diversify
their risk portfolio. This is an example of policy that can increase the efficacy of the saving
channel. There is no clear consensus on exactly what was responsible for the structural break
in India’s growth process in the early 1980s.8 What is clear is that the structural break led
to three decades of robust growth in India. Basu and Maertens (2007) suggests that the
bank reforms of the 1970s and the subsequent increase in saving rate is possibly responsible
for the structural break and subsequent increase in per-capita income.
7Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans et al. (1965)
8Wallack (2003), Rodrik and Subramanian (2004), DeLong (2003)
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2.3. Factor accumulation. A significant strand of the endogenous growth theory stresses
that the inalienable human capital the workers possess is one of the key factor inputs that
influences the growth trajectory of a country. A range of empirical studies find that public
goods are crucial in facilitating the acquisition of human capital. Duflo (2001) establishes
a causal link between school building in the 1970s in Indonesia to workers’ increased years
of education and higher wages in the area where the schools were built. Banerjee and Duflo
(2006) and Muralidharan and Prakash (2017) show that transport to school is causally linked
to the enrolment rates in school in Bihar (India).
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) find that Uganda spends 20% of its government expendi-
ture on primary education, of which only 13% reaches the school and rest 87% lost to local
corruption. Others survey suggest that the situation is similar in other African countries.
Reinikka and Svensson (2003) find that an information campaign in the newspaper signifi-
cantly increased the proportion of funds reaching the schools that had a newspaper outlet in
its vicinity. In a similar vein, Besley and Burgess (2002) find that government’s in states in
India where local language newspaper circulation is high are also more responsiveness when
it comes to providing relief for droughts and floods.
Besley and Ghatak (2006) make the useful distinction between market supporting public
goods, which give the poor access to markets and market augmenting public goods, which
provide the correct level of public good where the market does not. Infrastructure can
potentially play both roles by dramatically change the cost of delivering public goods. Das
and Hammer (2004) illustrate the problems of sins of omission and sins of commission in the
public and private provisions of services. They examine the quality of services provided by
doctors in Delhi public and private health care centres. They find that public doctors are
better qualified but less diligent whereas private doctors less qualified and ready to please
the patients, even if it means over-prescribing the medicines. Grogan and Sadanand (2013)
find that electrification increased the propensity of rural women to work outside the home
by about 23% in Nicaraguan. Dinkelman (2011) finds that household electrification raises
employment by releasing women from home production and enabling microenterprises.
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There is a feedback loop between the beliefs people possess and the congestion that results
in any economic system. Public goods can potentially shape this feedback loop. For instance
in traffic, de jure rules and traffic density determine the congestion, which in turn determines
the adherence to those rules. Thus, the only de jure rules that survive are the ones that
correspond to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the system Basu (2010). In the aftermath of
the horrific 2006 Mecca stampede, Haase et al. (2016) examined pedestrian crowd flows using
computational methods and designed, implemented, and supervised a new set of pathways.
Devising pathways also require devising new rules pilgrims are supposed to follow. Devising
appropriate de jure rule is a resource-intensive process and requires fiscal capacity.
North (1990) maps the role beliefs play in establishing institutions and Williamson (2000)
warns that institutions can be classified according to how amenable they are to change.
Some institutions are deeply embedded and hardwired into the societies whereas are there
are other ones that respond to the government’s policy. Designing policy requires attention
given that they are easier to destroy than to create. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show with
an experiment how a badly designed pecuniary fine can easily destroy social institutions and
the social institutions does not bounce back once the pecuniary fine is taken away. Policy
can thus lead to hysteresis. Lefebvre (1974) gives an account of contemporary space with the
advent of modern state and impact accelerated accumulation of capital during had on France
during the “Trente Glorieuses” or three decades of prosperity that France witnessed after
1945. What is striking is the significant role transport and communication plays in almost
all the empirical results above. In a developing country, these are activities that traditionally
fall in the government’s domain. The empirical evidence thus points to the importance of
the fiscal channel in determining the prosperity of the country.
3. The Environment
The economy’s output Y is given by the production function
Y = F (K¯,K,AL) (1)
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where K is the stock of privately owned capital and L is the number of agents in the economy.
K¯ is the stock of public goods subject to congestion. K¯ represents public goods like courts,
roads and other infrastructure. Benefits derived from them declines if they are intensively
used. Hence, K¯ represents public goods subject to congestion, i.e., public goods that are
non-excludable but retain some degree of rivalry. A is labour-augmenting technology change
that exogenously determined in line with Uzawa (1965). The production function F ( · ) is
described by following assumptions.
Assumption 1. F : R3+ → R+ is homogenous of degree 1.
Assumption 2. F (K¯,K,AL) is continuous and twice differentiable in K¯,K and L and
satisfies the following conditions: FK¯ , FK , FL > 0, FK¯K¯ , FKK , FLL < 0 and FK¯K,FK¯L, FKL >
0 for K¯,K, L ∈ [0,∞).
Assumption 3. F (0, K,AL) = F (K¯, 0, AL) = F (K¯,K, 0) = 0 for K¯,K, L > 0.
Assumption 4 (Inada Conditions). F (K¯,K,AL) satisfies the following conditions:
limK→0 FK¯ , FK , FL =∞ and limK→∞ FK¯ , FK , FL = 0.
Assumption 1 allows us to transform the production function (1) and write it terms of per
effective worker, i.e., : Y
AL
= F
(
K¯
AL
, K
AL
, 1
)
or
y = f(k¯, k) (2)
where y = Y
AL
, k¯ = K¯
AL
and k = K
AL
and the properties of f : R2+ → R+ follow from the As-
sumptions 2, 3 and 4. The assumption of monotonicity, strict concavity9 and differentiability
follow from Assumption 1 and 2. There properties are going to be very useful in pinning
down the the transitional dynamics of the model.
The production function (2) essentially says that output per effective worker increasing
and concave in both private capital per effective worker and public goods per effective worker
and the marginal productivity.
9The concavity implies that f(k¯t,kt)
k¯
and f(k¯t,kt)k are decreasing in k¯ and k respectively.
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Assumption 5. ∀t ∈ [0,∞), Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt and At+1 = (1 + g)At.
Assumption 5 simply implies that L and A grow at constant exogenously determined rates
n and A respectively. Private capital K depreciates at a constant rate δ and public goods K¯
depreciates at the rate δ¯. Assumption 6 is a restriction on the parameters to ensure global
asymptotical stability of the steady state of the growth model.
Assumption 6. (δ¯ + n+ g) ∈ (0, 1) and (δ + n+ g) ∈ (0, 1).
Given Assumption 1, a representative one worker firm suffices for the analysis. The firms
are price takers. The one-worker firm maximises its profits pi = f(k¯t, kt)− (r+ δ)k−w. The
factor markets clear and give us r + δ = f ′(k¯, k) and w = A
[
f(k¯t, kt)− fk(k, k)k
]
.
National Income Accounting. τ proportion of the agents’ income is taxed by the gov-
ernment, accruing the government tax revenue of τY and leaving agents a disposable income
of (1− τ)Y . ς is the public goods investment rate, that is, the government spends ς portion
of the tax revenues on public goods and (1 − ς) proportion of tax revenues leaks, i.e., it is
either redistributed back to the agents through transfers or is lost to corruption. In either
case, it simply ends back in the economy as disposable income. Given that the tax revenue
lost to corruption ends back in the private hands and becomes part of the disposable income,
the final disposable income is (1− ςτ)Y . Thus, from the current output Y , (1− s)(1− ςτ)Y
is consumed, s(1 − ςτ)Y is saved and invested in private capital and ςτY gets invested in
public goods in the current period.
Significance of τ, ς and s. It is useful at this point to think about what s, τ and ς
parameters of the model signify. τ is simply the marginal rate at which output is taxed
in the economy and quite easy to observe. s and ς represent the channels through which
output not consumed in the current period is transformed into private capital and public
goods respectively. Hence, s and ς are reduced form parameters that represent all the
institutions and constraints that affect the private capital and public goods accumulation
channel. Consequently, s and ς far more difficult to pin down for empirical purposes.
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4. Model
The saving s(1− ςτ)Y by agents augments the private capital stock after the depreciated
private capital stock is replaced. The private capital stock at time t is given by
Kt+1 = s(1− ςτ)F (K¯t, Kt, AtLt)− δKt. (3)
The stock of public goods is augmented by government’s tax revenues ςτY after the
depreciated public goods stock is replaced. The public goods stock at time t is given by
K¯t+1 = ςτF (K¯t, Kt, AtLt)− δ¯K¯t. (4)
Using Assumption 5, we can re-write (3) and (4) in terms of per-effective effective worker.
kt+1 = s(1− ςτ) f(k¯t, kt) + (1− δ − n− g)kt (5)
k¯t+1 = ςτ f(k¯t, kt) + (1− δ¯ − n− g)k¯t (6)
(5) and (6) together are a system of autonomous non-linear difference equation system that
describe the evolution of the economy. The dynamic co-evolution of kt+1 and k¯t+1 is inter-
linked through the production function f(k¯t, kt) and is independent of time.
The economy is in a steady state if kt = kt+1 . . . = kt+n and k¯t = k¯t+1 . . . = k¯t+n for some
large integer n. Setting k¯t+1 = k¯t = k¯ and kt+1 = kt = k in (5) and (6) gives us Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The economy is at a steady state if either k¯ = k = 0 or the following condition
holds:
f(k¯, k)
k
=
δ + n+ g
s(1− ςτ)
f(k¯, k)
k¯
=
δ¯ + n+ g
ςτ
(7)
Lemma 1 essentially says that in steady state, the average products of private capital k
and public goods k¯ are each equal to constants determined by the parameters of the model.
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Corollary 1 follows directly from 1 and would help us determine the nature of potential
steady states.
Corollary 1. For k¯, k > 0, k¯
k
= δ+n+g
δ¯+n+g
· ςτ
s(1−ςτ) always holds in the steady state.
Corollary 1 says that for all non-zero steady states, the ratio of public goods and private
capital in the economy is constant and depends on the relative efficacy of the saving (s) and
fiscal channel (ς and τ).
In the rest of the section, we will establish uniqueness and the stability properties of the
steady state. As we will see, uniqueness requires very few restrictions on the production
function. Conversely, the restrictions required for local and global stability is far more
stringent.
Lemma 2. For k¯ ∈ (0,∞) and k ∈ (0,∞), there exists a unique steady state if the produc-
tion is homogenous of degree 1 (Assumptions 1) and ∂F
∂L
> 0.
Proof. Given that F (K¯,K,AL) is homogenous of degree 1 and ∂F
∂L
> 0 ∀L ∈ (0,∞), we can
say that for an arbitrary λ,
F (λk¯, λk, 1) > F (λk¯, λk, λ) if λ ∈ (0, 1)
F (λk¯, λk, 1) < F (λk¯, λk, λ) if λ ∈ (1,∞)
Using the defintion of f(·) we can write F (λk¯, λk, 1) = f(λk¯, λk) and F (λk¯, λk, λ) =
λf(k¯, k). It follows that
f(λk¯, λk) > λf(k¯, k) if λ ∈ (0, 1)
f(λk¯, λk) < λf(k¯, k) if λ ∈ (1,∞)
15
Dividing through by k¯ and k respectively and rearranging gives us
f(λk¯, λk)
λk¯
>
f(k¯, k)
k¯
f(λk¯, λk)
λk
>
f(k¯, k)
k
if λ ∈ (0, 1)
f(λk¯, λk)
λk¯
<
f(k¯, k)
k¯
f(λk¯, λk)
λk
<
f(k¯, k)
k
if λ ∈ (1,∞)
Let k¯ = k◦ and k = k◦ be one set of steady state values that satisfies (7). For uniqueness,
we need to show that there cannot be another set that can satisfy (7).
From Lemma 1 we know that in the steady state, the average product of public goods and
private capital are a particular constant. If λ ∈ (0, 1),
f(λk¯◦, λk◦)
λk¯◦
>
f(k¯◦, k◦)
k¯◦
=
δ¯ + n+ g
ςτ
f(λk¯◦, λk◦)
λk◦
>
f(k¯◦, k◦)
k◦
=
δ + n+ g
s(1− ςτ) . (8)
(8) shows us that if λ ∈ (0, 1) the average product of public goods and private capital are
higher than the steady state level and it it follows from Assumption 2 that the public and
private capital will always less than the steady state level. Conversely, if λ ∈ (1,∞),
f(λk¯◦, λk◦)
λk¯◦
<
f(k¯◦, k◦)
k¯◦
=
δ¯ + n+ g
ςτ
f(λk¯◦, λk◦)
λk◦
<
f(k¯◦, k◦)
k◦
=
δ + n+ g
s(1− ςτ) (9)
(9) shows us that if λ ∈ (1,∞) the average product of public goods and private capital
are lower than the steady state level and it follows from Assumption 2 that the public and
private capital will always greater the steady state level.
This implies that for k¯, k > 0, there is a unique steady state associated with λ = 1 and no
other steady states exist for λ ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (1,∞). 
It follow from Lemma 2 that there is a unique steady state for k¯, k > 0. Let k¯∗ and k∗
respectively be the steady state values of private capital and public goods that satisfies (7).
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Local and Global Asymptotically Stability. Defining g : R2+ → R+ and h : R2+ → R+
allows us to write kt+1 and k¯t+1 in the following form:
kt+1 = g(k¯t, kt) ≡ s(1− ςτ)f(k¯t, kt) + (1− (δ + n+ g))k (10)
k¯t+1 = h(k¯t, kt) ≡ ςτf(k¯t, kt) + (1− (δ¯ + n+ g))k¯. (11)
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that g and h are continuous and twice differentiable. ςτf(k¯
∗,k∗)
k¯t
=
(δ¯ + n+ g) and s(1−ςτ)f(k¯
∗,k∗)
kt
= (δ + n+ g) imply that
h(k¯∗, k∗) = k¯∗ (12)
g(k¯∗, k∗) = k∗ (13)
.
Proposition. The steady state (k¯∗, k∗) of the non-linear difference equation system, k¯t+1 =
h(k¯t, kt) and kt+1 = g(k¯t, kt), is locally asymptotically stable.
To establish the local asymptotic stability, we would show below that hk¯(k¯t, kt) ∈ (0, 1)
and gk(k¯t, kt) ∈ (0, 1). That is for a sufficiently small ε1, ε2 > 0, if |k¯t − k∗| < ε1 and
|kt − k∗| < ε2, then limt→∞ k¯t = k¯∗ and limt→∞ kt = k∗.
Proof. It follows from Assumption 1 and 2 that gk(k¯t, kt) and hk¯(k¯t, kt) will always exist and
will always be positive.
gk(k¯t, kt) = s(1− ςτ)fk(k¯t, kt) + (1− (δ + n+ g)) > 0
hk¯(k¯t, kt) = ςτfk¯(k¯t, kt) + (1− (δ¯ + n+ g)) > 0
since fk(k¯t, kt) > 0, fk¯(k¯t, kt) > 0, s > 0, τ > 0 and from Assumption 6.
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For a strictly concave function differentiable function f(k¯t, kt),
f(k¯t, kt) > f(k¯, 0) + kfk(k¯, k) = kfk(k¯, k)
f(k¯t, kt) > f(0, k) + k¯fk¯(k¯, k) = k¯(fk¯)(k¯, k)
because f(k¯, 0) = f(0, k) = 0. (δ + n+ g) = s(1−ςτ)f(k¯
∗,k∗)
k∗ > s(1− ςτ)fk(k¯∗, k∗) implies that
gk(k¯
∗, k∗) = s(1− ςτ)fk(k¯∗, k∗) + (1− (δ + n+ g)) < 1
Similarly, (δ¯ + n+ g) = ςτf(k¯
∗,k∗)
k¯∗ > ςτfk¯(k
∗, k¯∗) implies that
hk¯(k¯
∗, k∗) = ςτfk(k¯∗, k∗) + (1− (δ¯ + n+ g)) < 1
Thus, hk¯(k¯t, kt) ∈ (0, 1) and gk(k¯t, kt) ∈ (0, 1). 
Proposition. The steady state of (k¯∗, k∗) of the non-linear difference equation system,
k¯t+1 = h(k¯t, kt) and kt+1 = g(k¯t, kt), is globally asymptotically stable.
We would like to show that global stability exists any given pair of (kt, k¯t) where k¯t ∈ (0, k¯∗)
and kt ∈ (0, k∗). This entails showing that for any t and t + 1, 0 < kt < kt+1 < k∗ and
0 < k¯t < k¯t+1 < k¯
∗.
Proof. We know from Assumption 1 and 2 that f(k¯t, kt) is concave in k¯t and kt and that
f(k¯t,kt)
kt
and f(k¯t,kt)
k¯t
are decreasing in k¯t and kt respectively. Hence, for any kt < k
∗, we can
write
kt+1−kt
kt
=
s(1− ςτ)f(k¯t, kt)
kt
− (δ + n+ g)
>
s(1− ςτ)f(k¯∗, k∗)
k∗
− (δ + n+ g) = 0 (14)
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For any k¯t < k¯
∗, we can write
k¯t+1 − k¯t
k¯t
=
ςτf(k¯t, kt)
k¯t
− (δ¯ + n+ g)
>
ςτf(k¯∗, k∗)
k¯t
− (δ¯ + n+ g) = 0 (15)
Thus, for any k¯∗ ∈ (0, k¯∗) and kt ∈ (0, k∗), we have k¯t+1−k¯tk¯t > 0 and
kt+1−kt
kt
> 0. This
naturally implies that kt < ket+1 and k¯t < k¯t+1, i.e., private capital and public goods would
increase each period if they are not at the steady state level.
Next, we would like to show that for any k¯t ∈ (0, k¯∗) and kt ∈ (0, k∗), k¯t+1 < k¯∗ and
kt+1 < k
∗. Using (10), (11), (12), (13) and the Fundamental theorem of Calculus, we can
write
kt+1 − k∗ = g(k¯t, kt)− g(k¯∗, k∗)
=
[
g(k¯t, kt)− g(k¯∗, kt)
]
+
[
g(k¯∗, kt)− g(k¯∗, k∗)
]
= −
∫ k¯∗
k¯t
gk¯(k¯, kt)dk¯ −
∫ k∗
kt
gk(k¯
∗, k)dk < 0 (16)
We know that gk¯(k¯t, kt) = sfk¯(k¯t, kt) > 0 and gk(k¯t, kt) ∈ (0, 1) for all k¯t, kt > 0. Thus, using
(14) and (16) it is established that 0 < kt < kt+1 < k
∗. Similarly,
k¯t+1 − k¯∗ = h(k¯t, kt)− h(k¯∗, k∗)
=
[
h(k¯t, kt)− h(k¯t, k∗)
]
+
[
h(k¯t, k
∗)− h(k¯∗, k∗)]
= −
∫ k∗
kt
hk¯(k¯, kt)dk −
∫ k¯∗
k¯t
hk(k¯
∗, k)dk¯ < 0 (17)
We know that hk(k¯t, kt) = τfk(k¯t, kt) > 0 and hk¯(k¯t, kt) ∈ (0, 1) for all k¯t, kt > 0. Thus,
using (15) and (17) it is established that 0 < k¯t < k¯t+1 < k¯
∗.
These two arguments together establish that for all k¯t ∈ (0, k¯∗) and kt ∈ (0, k∗), k¯t+1 ∈
(0, k¯∗) and kt+1 ∈ (0, k∗). Therefore, {k¯t}∞t=0 and {kt}∞t=0 are monotonically increasing and
are respectively bounded above by k¯∗ and k∗. Moreover, since (k¯∗, k∗) is the unique steady
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state for k¯, k > 0, there exists no k¯′t ∈ (0, k¯∗) and k′t ∈ (0, k∗) such that k¯t+1 = k¯∗ = k¯′ and
kt+1 = k
∗ = k′ for any t. Therefore, {k¯t}∞t=0 and {kt}∞t=0 must monotonically converge to k¯∗
and k∗. From a similar set of deductive arguments, it follows that for all k¯t > k¯∗ and kt > k∗,
k¯t+1 ∈ (k¯∗, k¯t) and kt+1 ∈ (k∗, kt) and that {k¯t}∞t=0 and {kt}∞t=0 monotonically converge to k¯∗
and k∗. This complete the proof of global stability. 
5. Cobb-Douglas Steady State
A Cobb-Douglas production function that satisfies the homogenous of degree 1 (Assump-
tion 1) takes the form of Y = K¯βKα(AL)1−(α+β) where α, β > 0 and α+β < 1. In per-capita
form, it can be written as
y = k¯βkα (18)
where β and α represent the elasticity of output with respect to public goods and private
capital in Cobb-Douglas production function (18).10
The system of difference equations for the economy in the Cobb-Douglas case is as follows.
kt+1 = s(1− ςτ) k¯βkα + (1− δ − n− g)kt (19)
k¯t+1 = ςτ k¯
βkα + (1− δ¯ − n− g)k¯t (20)
Figure 1 and 2 below show the results of simulations run on the difference equation system
(19) and (20). In Figure 1, the public good stock and private capital start from arbitrary
value and are seen to converge to the steady state level.
In Figure 2 the value of public goods and private capital are shocked from their steady
state level and then are seen to converge back to the steady state level. Figure 1 and 2
10The Euler’s theorem allows a rather insightful interpretation of exponents in case of a Cobb-Douglas
production function that is homogenous of degree 1. If the factors are paid their marginal product, the
exponent of factor is also the output share received by that factor. Thus, share of output hypothetically
due to public goods, private capital and labour would be α, β and 1− (α+ β) respectively. Public goods in
this model is funded by exogenously determined proportional tax that is distortionary. Thus, even though
public goods are unlikely to receive their marginal product, we can use the exponent to indicate the extent
to which the factor contribute to the output.
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0
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Figure 1. Simulation of output and public and private capital over time
show in how the co-evolution of public goods and private capital are interlinked in (19) and
(20). In Solow-Swan growth framework either assumes that the two types of capital are pure
substitutes or pure complements and always exist in fixed ratio. If they are pure substitutes,
investment in public goods has no distinctive role and does not really matter. If they are
pure complements, then there exists some mechanism of ensuring that they accumulate in
such a way that their proportions remain fixed. Simulations in Figure 1 and 2 show that
neither of these two cases can be nested in the economy described by (19) and (20) and its
the distinction between public goods and private capital is not superflous.
50 t = 100
40
80 = 0.30 = 0.30 s = 0.70 t = 0.40
kt
kt
yt
50 t = 100
40
80 = 0.30 = 0.30 s = 0.70 t = 0.40
kt
kt
yt
Figure 2. The effect of shock increase in public and private capital
Two Channels. The output of the economy depends on stock of both public goods and
private capital and their respective values are interlinked in the difference equation system
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defined by (20) and (19). To gain insight into how this difference equation system works, it
is useful to analyse the locus of of all the points where k¯t+1 = k¯t and kt+1 = kt in the (k¯, k)
space.
Setting k¯t+1 = k¯t in (20) and gives us (21). This is the k¯(k) locus in Figure 3, the locus of
all the points for which k¯ remains constant.
k¯(k) =
[
ςτ
δ¯ + n+ g
] 1
1−β
k
α
1−β (21)
Setting kt+1 = kt in (19) and gives us (22). This gives us the locus k(k¯) in Figure 3, the
locus of all the points for which k remains constant.
k(k¯) =
[
s(1− ςτ)
δ + n+ g
] 1
1−α
k¯
β
1−α (22)
The intersection of the two locus gives us the steady state where both k¯ and k remains
constant. Starting with any arbitrary k¯ and k, the transitional dynamics characterised by
(19) and (20) will ensure that the economy will gravitate towards the steady state in Figure
3.
k¯
k
k¯(k)
k(k¯)
k¯
k
k¯(k)
k(k¯)
Figure 3. Impact of an increase in ςτ (left panel) or s (right panel) on k¯(k)
and k(k¯).
An increase in either ς or τ has an impact on the steady state through two different
channels, the fiscal channel working through (21) and the saving channel working through
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(22). For a given k, an increase in ςτ increases k¯ through the public-goods tax-revenue
channel. For a given k¯, an increase in ςτ reduces the disposable income and thus lowers the
k through the private-capital savings channel. The left panel of Figure 3 depicts the effect of
an increase in ςτ . The k¯(k) locus shifts right and the k(k¯) locus shifts down as a result. An
increase in ςτ is likely to lead to a higher k¯ and lower k. The impact on output is ambiguous
and depends on the values of β and α.
The right panel of Figure 3 depicts the impact of an increase in s. The k(k¯) locus shifts
up and k¯(k) locus remains where it way, leading to an increase in both k and k¯ and a higher
output. Similarly, an increase in either n or g shift the k¯(k) towards left and shifts the
k(k¯) locus down lowering the steady state public goods, private capital and output levels.
δ¯ + n+ g will only affect the k(k) locus and δ + n+ g will only affect the k¯(k) locus.
5.1. Steady State in the Cobb-Douglas case. Lemma 3 characterises the steady state
of the economy.
Lemma 3. For k¯ ∈ (0,∞) and k ∈ (0,∞), the economy has a unique steady (k¯∗, k∗) state
where
k¯∗ =
(
s(1− ςτ)
δ + n+ g
) α
1−(α+β)
(
ςτ
δ¯ + n+ g
) 1−α
1−(α+β)
k∗ =
(
s(1− ςτ)
δ + n+ g
) 1−β
1−(α+β)
(
ςτ
δ¯ + n+ g
) β
1−(α+β)
(23)
The steady state output and consumption per-effective worker is given by
y∗ =
(
s(1− ςτ)
δ + n+ g
) α
1−(α+β)
(
ςτ
δ¯ + n+ g
) β
1−(α+β)
(24)
c∗ = (1− s)
(
sα (1− ςτ)1−β(ςτ)β
(δ + n+ g)α(δ¯ + n+ g)β
) 1
1−(α+β)
(25)
The elasticity of consumption per-effective worker is given by
εc,τ = τ
dln c
dτ
=
ςτ
1− (α + β)
[
β
ςτ
− 1− β
1− ςτ
]
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and is increasing in the range τ ∈ (0, β
ς
)
and decreasing in the range τ ∈ (β
ς
, 1
)
. The
consumption maximising tax rate of τ = β
ς
is decreasing in ς implying that any institutional
reform process that reduces the leakage or redistribution represented by ς could reduce the
tax rate at which the consumption would be maximised.
If β, the elasticity of output with respect to public goods is positive, then (23) and (24)
represent the real model of the world. In that case, as ςτ → 0, not only does k¯∗ → 0, it
also means that k¯∗ → 0. This happens because the accumulation process of public goods
and private capital are intricately linked through the nature of the production process. This
naturally implies that as ςτ → 0, we also have y∗ → 0. It is important to note that the policy
implications that follow are not to simply follow the rhetorical policy of just increasing the
tax rate τ . What matters is the ςτ . Thus, the ς needs to increase concomitantly along with
τ .
τ thus represents the fiscal capacity of the state in terms of public goods, i.e., the gov-
ernment’s ability to collect tax and spend it on public goods. There is a subtle nuance here
that needs to be emphasised. If the government spends the resources on a public goods
on a project the rate of success is stochastically determined. If the investment succeeds,
then the country gets a public good. If the project fails, the resource spent on the project
becomes redistribution. Thus, when it comes to investing in stochastic public goods, the ς
is determined by the expected value of the public goods and the government cannot ensure
a sufficiently high value of ς unless it has mechanism of determining good bets or is good at
“picking winners”. Increase tax rate with a low rate of “picking winners” will just lead to
a low ςτ , which will lead back to low steady state value of k¯∗, k∗ and y∗. This is not just a
problem of low-income countries, it is a potential problem develop countries can fall into. It
is important to take away from this that maxining consumption in the long run requires an
effective fiscal channel that includes not just the nominal tax rate but also the institutions
that ensure that a sufficiently high proportion of tax revenues are invested in public goods
and not entirely lost to redistribution or corruption.
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6. Conclusions
In spite of its impeccable spartan elegance, Solow-Swan growth models has not had much
to say about development. Given that it takes the saving rate as exogenous has been seen as
a flaw. In the case of developing countries, given that we still don’t understand exactly how
to model saving for the poor, it works as a good workhorse model. It has till now not been
able to say anything about how the economic activity in the public and the private domain
of the economy interact. The paper has argued that the right way to understand this is
to think of channels that transform output into public goods and private capital. We show
that prosperity of the country depends on both channels working effectively. The impact of
a reform that increases the efficacy of fiscal channel depend also on the state of the saving
channel and vice-versa. Capital market reforms and fiscal reforms are often implemented in
isolation. It would be judicious to implement them simultaneously.
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